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Down and Out: RIFed Employees, taxes, and
Employment Discrimination Claims After Burke and
Schleier
F. Philip Manns, Jr.'

I. INTRODUCTION
The downsizing of corpo'rate America continues apace. In 1993 and
1994, employers fired over one million workers. I Nearly all fired
employees are paid a termination package consisting of cash, outplacement service, short-term continuation of employer-provided health
insurance,2 or a combination of the three. 3 For that consideration,

* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. 1 thank my friend and colleague
Daniel B. Yeager for his thoughtful review of the manuscript and his sustained contributions to
my work, the members of the Kansas Law Review, especially Andrew F. Halaby and Joyce
Rosenberg, for their helpful editing, and the California Western School of Law for support through
its faculty research grants program.
I. More Than Half a Million Job Cuts in 1994; Year-end Research Indicates Layoffs Are
Way of Life for Corporations, PR Newswire, Jan. 5,1995 (citing THE CHALLENGER EMPLOYMENT
REPORT, a publication of Challenger Gray & Christmas, an employment consulting tirm). Job
losses are concentrated highly in the nation's largest employers; the 25 largest staff reductions
announced since early 1991 cost over 600,000 jobs. The Pain of DOlVnsi=ing, Bus. WK .. May 9.
1994, at I. "Downsizing" encompasses corporate contraction in areas in addition to number of
employees, including contractions of equity, working capital, and corporate investment. Because
1 am concerned only with the tax treatment of "downsized" employees, I usc the older term
"reduction in force" or "RIF" to refer specifically to contractions in employment. RIFs by large,
publicly-held corporations likely will continue, for they are part of a systemic shift in corporate
financial structure. Harvard Business School Professor Gordon Donaldson recently observed that
"[t]he corporate agenda of the 1980s was dominated by the interests of the investors of tinancial
capital, in contrast to the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, when it was dominated by the interests
of the investors of human capital: the organizational priorities of career employees," GORDON
DONALDSON, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: MANAGING THE CHANGE PROCESS FROM WITHIN 12
(1994). He also observed that
the erosion of claims on the corporate income stream on the part of the work force.
from middle management down to unionized workers through decline in job
opportunity, wages, and benefits, which has characterized the early 1990s. has been
accompanied by a loss of bargaining power that only tlill employment will restore.
Only then will the investors of human capital have the potential to begin to regain some
of the lost ground yielded to shareholders.
Id. at 45.
2. Under the "continuation coverage requirements of group health plans." I.R.C. ~ 4980B
(1988), all terminated employees may continue employer-provided health insurance coverage tor
a period, usually 18 months, at the employee's expense. See id. 4980B(0. Under buyouts, the
employers agree to absorb the charges for some or all of that period.
3. Evan Ramstad, After Cuts, Ex-IBM Workers Taking on IRS, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 1994, at
CII ("There's no question that most everybody who leaves a company today gets a severance of
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employees quit employment and usually execute general releases of all
claims against the employer, specifically including employment
discrimination claims, for federal law requires specific reference before
a waiver is effective. 4
During the past two years, employees fired in programmatic
reductions in force ("RIFs") have been paid tens of billions of dollars:
if taxable, the federal income tax on that amount would exceed ten
billion dollars. s Some RIFed employees exclude the cash portion of the

some kind.") (quoting John Challenger, Executive Vice President, Challenger Gray & Christmas).
4. See 29 U.S.c. § 626(1) (Supp. V 1993); 3 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 35.2A (2d ed. Supp. 1992). In 1990, Congress amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to establish conditions for waivers of ADEA rights. for programmatic
terminations, the requirements are (A) an agreement "written in a manner calculated to be
understood;" (B) which specifically references ADEA claims; (C) which waives no rights arising
after execution of the document; (D) which is in return for consideration in addition to that to
which the releasor already is entitled; (E) which advises the releasor in writing to consult an
attorney; (F) which is signed no less than 21 days after presentation to the releas.or; and (G) which
provides a seven day period during which the waiver may be revoked. Id. A waiver in an
individual case, rather than a program, need meet only (A) through (E). Although the above
criteria expressly apply only to ADEA waivers and not to other employment discrimination
statutes, most releases specifically reference "employment discrimination claims, including the
ADEA" rather than just the ADEA, because the requirements for ADEA waivers are incorporated
into the other employment discrimination laws by judicial decision. See infra note 61.
Consequently, virtually all programmatic terminations now contain waivers designed to meet those
criteria.
5. About one million employees were tired in 1993 and 1994. See supra note I.
Determining an average of termination consideration per tired employee is ditlicult. Employers
do not announce the amount when RIFs are announced; the cost announced usually is the total
charge to earnings taken for a restructuring plan, of which the RIF is part. Supposing each tired
employee receives $10,000 in termination consideration, the total amount of consideration is $10
billion. Sporadic data from tax cases in which the tax treatment of termination consideration is
litigated suggests an average of $20,000 to $30,000, which would aggregate to between $20 and
$30 billion.
Like virtually all tax issues. the tax treatment of termination consideration has two sides. both
equally substantial. This article addresses only the tax consequences to employees receiving
termination packages. The other side is the tax treatment of the employer, who wants to deduct
currently the substantial costs of the RIF. Following the Court's decision in INDOPCO v.
Commissioner. 503 U.S. 79 (1992). the deductibility as a current expense of termination payments
cam.e into ques.tion. In INDOPCO, the Court decided that capitalization of expenses is the general
rule, rather than the exception, and that an expense must be capitalized whenever it yields more
than incidental future benefits. Id. at 84, 87. The capitalization/current deduction question is a
particularly high stakes issue for the employer; if currently deductible. the expenses yield a large
tax deduction in the year incurred; if not currently deductible. the expenses probably would not
be deductible until the employer sold or abandoned the business. for it is unlikely that the
employer could show an ascertainable useful life of the RIF program. necessary to depreciating
a capital expense. A strong argument can be made that RIF program expenses do yield more than
incidental future benefits through reduced operating costs and increased etliciency. and therefore
should be capitalized and not currently deducted. Nonetheless, the Service conceded the issue in
late 1994. In Rev. Rul. 94-77. 1994-2 C.B. 19. the Service ruled that. notwithstanding INDOPCO.
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termination consideration from their taxable incomes-the Internal
Revenue Code ("Code") excludes personal injury damages from gross
income-and the employees contend that the cash is "damages received
... on account of personal injur[y],"6 RIF ed employees argue that (I)
they are within a group protected from discrimination by an employment discrimination statute, 7 (2) by virtue of the releases they have
settled employment discrimination claims, (3) the cash paid is allocable
to settlement of the discrimination claims, and (4) damages received on
account of discrimination are thus "damages received ... on account
of personal injur[y].,,8
The Internal Revenue Service ("Service") disagrees, announcing 111
a March 1994 News Release:
.
A new mistake affects some people who lost their jobs due to corporate·
downsizing or restructuring. They often receive severance pay, which is
taxable. As part of their separation agreements. they may also sign waivers
releasing their fonner employers from potential future claims. Some have
mistakenly treated the payments as nontaxable damages because of the
waivers. According to the IRS, however, such waivers do not change the
taxable nature of the severance pay, a conclusion reached in two 1993 court
cases.~

The News Release does not identify the cases, Code sections, or other
authority for its conclusions, nor does it disclose how the normally factsensitive determination of whether a payment is "severance pay" or
"damages" can be decided on a broad basis. Undeterred, groups of

severance payments are currently deductible because they relate principally to previously rendered
services of the R1Fed employees.
6. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988); see Edward P. Jones, IBM's. Other Early Retirees Could Be
In For Large Refunds, 63 TAX NOTES 325 (1994):
Attorneys for a number of workers who retired early during IBM's "downsizing" claim
that at least part of their severance pay should be exempt from taxes. The money
amounts to a settlement of possible age discrimination claims, they say, and such
settlements are not subject to income tax. IBM says the payments are taxable.
Id. at 325.
7. Discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color. religion, sex, national origin.
handicap, or age (if the employee is at least 40 years of age) is prohibited. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 § 703,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); Americans with Disabilities Act §102,
42 U.S.c. § 12112 (Supp. V 1993); Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 4. 29 U.S.C. §§
623,631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
8. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). See Loren C. Rosenzweig, Careful Planning May Establish
Excludability of Damages Awarded for Age Discrimination, 81 1. TAX'N 254 (1994) (prior to
Schleier, noting that the vast majority of post-Burke ADEA cases held ADEA damages excludable,
and suggesting the structuring of R1F tenninations as settlements of ADEA and other tort claims.
together with the employee's separate agreement to indemnify the employer if the tax planning
does not work).
9. I.R.S. News Release IR-95-25 (March 17, 1994), available in Westlaw, FTX-CSRELS
Database.
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former IBM workers in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina,
New York, and Texas, and former workers in Texas of USAA, a
financial services firm, are working on refund claims; tax refunds have
been received by some, but the Service has said that it would correct
those "mistakes."lo Royce Powell, a lawyer representing I ,500 former
IBM employees, has filed a tax refund suit in the Court of Federal
Claims. Mr. Powell agreed with the Justice Department to file one
representative case for each taxable year involving his many clients. I I
Deciding when "damages" (as opposed to something like wages,
salary, or "severance pay") are paid and whether employment discrimination damages are "on account of personal injur[y]"12 vexes the federal
courts. For instance, on the same day (August 30, 1994), the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits on near identical records reached opposite conclusions on whether damages recovered under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") are "damages received ... on account of
personal injur[y].,,13 Following those decisions, the Government filed
a petition for certiorari in a Fifth Circuit case excluding ADEA damages
from income, and the Court granted the petition. 14
The bulk of this Article addresses the question of whether employment discrimination damages are on account of personal injury. IS I also
consider the tax consequences of receiving two other pieces of the
typical termination package: medical insurance 16 and outplacement
services,17 especially as those benefits extend after termination. Two
exclusions from income are relevant. Section 106 excludes the health
plan coverage if it is "employer-provided coverage under an accident
or health plan,,,18 and section 132 excludes outplacement service from
income if it is a qualified fringe benefit. 19
I make the following three conclusions. Section I 04(a)(2) does not
permit exclusion of the cash termination consideration because even if

10. Moneyline (CNN television broadcast, July 5,1994), transcript available in LEX IS. News
Library, Scripts File; Ramstad, supra note 3, at CII.
II. Lee A. Sheppard, The Tax Treatment qf IBM's Golden Handshakes. 65 TAX NOTES 946.
946 (1994).
12. LR.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988).
13. Id.; see Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 838, 840 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting §
104(a)(2) in holding ADEA damages not excludable), cert. denied. liS S. Ct. 2576 (1995);
Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 792. 796 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting § 104(a)(2) in holding
ADEA damages excludable). vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995).
14. Commissioner v. Schleier, cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3380 (U.S. Nov. 14. 1994) (No.
94-500). Neither the Tax Court nor the Fifth Circuit opinion was reported.
15. See infra subpart ILA.
16. See infra subpart II.B.
17. See infra subpart II.C.
18. LR.C. § 106 (1988).
19. Id. § 132(a).
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payments made under a RIF program are made in settlement of tort
claims (a point that I prove, but that the Service and a few courts deny),
no consideration normally is allocable to those claims under prevailing
allocation rules, nor could an allocation meaningfully be made. 10
Conversely, section 106 excludes all employer-provided health
insurance coverage,21 notwithstanding unexplained employer representations to the contrary, for the Service interprets section 106 to require
only an employment relationship at some time and has excluded every
post-termination coverage it has considered. 22 Finally, section 132
excludes employer-provided outplacement service,23 notwithstanding a
revenue ruling that adds an ultra vires but ultimately meaningless
requirement to section 132.24 My proof for these three conclusions
follows. 25
II. ANALYSIS
A. Section l04(a)(2)

For our purposes the Code framework is simple. While section 61
includes in gross income "all income from whatever source derived,"26
section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income "damages received ...
on account of personal injuries.,,27 When determining whether damages

20.
21.
22.

See infra subpart II.A.
See infra subpart II.B.
See id
23. See infra subpart II.C.
24. See il?fra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
25. I represent a taxpayer who accepted IBM's Marketing and Services Company Transition
Payment and received cash and short-term continuation of medical insurance. My advice to her
was consistent with the conclusions of this Article: cash termination pay is taxable, notwithstanding her waiver of any sex discrimination claims, but employer-provided medical insurance
coverage is excludable trom gross income, notwithstanding IBM's curious representation to the
contrary. Moreover, because I filed a joint return with that client (I am married to her), I am
jointly liable tor the tax if my conclusion about ~ 106 is wrong. See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1988).
I do not think that the § 106 issue is even close-no post-ternlination coverage provided by a
tormer employer .ever has been ruled taxable by the Service, much less by a court. Further, absent
application of § 106, all "COBRA continuation coverage:' see Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 10001. 100 Stat. 82,222-37 (1986) (coditied
at 29 U.S.c. §~ 1161-1168), even when the employee pays the premium, would create gross
income. See I.R.C. § 61 (1988); Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F Jd 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1994)
("Congress has defined taxable income to include, generally, all income not specitically excluded
by the code."), cerl. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995). No one ever has suggested the possibility
that COBRA benetits are taxable. Consequently, I do not believe that my "self interest" in the §
106 issue affects my analysis in any way.
26. I.R.C. § 61 (a) (1988).
27. Id § 104(a)(2).
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payments are "gross income" under section 61, damages payments are
treated identically with the thing for which the damages
substitute28-we ask, "in lieu of what were the damages awarded?"
Employment termination payments are made in lieu of many things, all
of which constitute gross income under section 61, and no one credibly
disputes that employment termination payments would be included in
taxable income absent the exclusion of section 104(a)(2).29 When
deciding the section 104(a)(2) exclusion, the focus intertwines the
nature of the damages (as under section 61) and the nature of the claim
giving rise to the right to relief. 30 If the claim is in tort or is "tortlike,,,31 then all damages that are sufficiently caused by personal injury,
and received on behalf of the claim, are excludable from income.
But before we fully can answer a section I 04(a)(2) exclusion
question, we must learn some case-specific facts-what claims are in
the case, and what was paid for them. Courts interpreting section
104(a)(2) implicitly, if not explicitly, apply a three-part test. First,

28. See. e.g., Hort v. Commissioner, 3 \3 U.S. 28, 30 (1941) (holding that income received
in consideration of a lease cancellation is treated as the receipt of rent and not as a sale of
property).
29. No one credibly disputes that termination payments would be gross income absent
specific exclusion. The simple analytical framework of a broad definition of "gross income"
followed by some exclusions is lost on the Service. As recently as late March 1994, an apparently
exasperated Tax Court wrote:
Respondent argues that the Court of Appeals tor the Fifth Circuit would hold that the
entire settlement proceeds should be included in petitioners' gross income because the
proceeds represent an accession to wealth. The only support respondent cites tor that
contention, however. is a tootnote in a dissent in United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92.
103 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979) (Ainsworth, J., dissenting), a criminal tax evasion case, which
states: "The touchstone of the exclusion [amended by section 104(a)(2)] is the notion
that the funds received represent a restoration of funds rather than an accession to
wealth." Respondent, however, apparently misses the import of the Supreme Court's
opinion in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. [229], 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992). It is now
quite clear that damages received on account of a tort-like personal injury are
excludable under section 104(a)(2).
McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.e. 465,485 (1994).
30. Recognition of those two separate modes of analysis. "in lieu of what" versus "in lieu
of what claims," has not come easily. See infra notes 157-77 and accompanying text.
31. In United States v. Burke, the Supreme Court contirmed the point:
Neither the text nor the legislative history of § 104(a)(2) otTers any explanation of the
term "personal injuries." Since 1960, however, IRS regulations tonnally have linked
identitication of a personal injury for purposes of § 104(a)(2) to traditional tort
principles: "The term 'damages received (whether by suit or agreement)' means an
amount received ... through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort
type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution."
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,234 (1992) (footnote omitted) (citing 26 e.F.R. 1.l04-I(c)
(1991».

*
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what, if any, claims did the payment settle?32 Second, are any of those
claims tort-like, and for such claims, were damages paid on account of
personal as opposed to econom ic injuries?33 Third, what portion of the
payment is allocable to the tort (or tort-like) c1aims?34
In a typical RIF program, nO tort claims seem to exist at first glance;
the employer appears to have paid only contract consideration or
gratuitous severance pay. Yet the pervasive application of the employment discrimination laws, and the recent confirmation by Congress that
those laws regulate waivers of their protection,35 prove that employees
protected by the employment discrimination laws preemptively settle
employment discrimination claims in RIF waivers. In only one case has
a taxpayer even approached such an argument;36 recent legislative
changes, however, not applicable to that case and not argued to the
court, make the argument even stronger. 37 Nonetheless, even if
accepted, the argument satisfies only the first part of the test.
Second, the taxpayer must prove that employment discrimination
claims are tort-like and that the damages received on account of the
tort-like claims were for personal as opposed to economic injuries.
Resolving those questions splits the courts of appeals; 38 the Supreme
Court recently entered the fray,39 but raised as many questions as it
answered. Third, the RIFed employee must prove the amount that the
employer intended to pay the employee for the waiver of his or her
employment discrimination claims. The cumulative probability of
success on all three parts is negligible. Here is why.
1. What, If Any, Claims Did the Payment Settle?
The taxpayer loses the vast majority of employment-related section
I04(a)(2) cases on the first part because the court typically decides that
a settlement of claims did not occur, either because the taxpayer
asserted no claims or because the payor did not intend to pay anything
for those claims asserted. When the payment arises from a typical RIF
program, we seemingly encounter no claims at all because the employer, not the employee's claims, precipitated the termination. Consequently, cases like Stocks v. Commissioner,40 in which a particular employee

32.
33.

34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.

See infra notes 41-65 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 67-90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 41-65 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
See Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
98 T.c. I (1992). In Siocks, the plaintiff professor settled her breach of contract and race
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asserts employment discrimination claims and subsequently accepts a
negotiated termination payment in compromise of all claims against the
employer, would be exotic in the RIF context. More likely, a RIFed
employee accepts a standardized agreement and executes a form release
untailored to her individual claims. Without the express assertion of a
claim, the RIFed employee may have no basis to conclude that the
termination payment is "damages received." "A claim must be
asserted," the Southern District of New York told us, "before it can be
settled.,,41 In six of the seven reported RIF cases involving section
I04(a)(2), the taxpayer lost because she asserted no tort claim before
releasing the employer. 42 The typical view is that an employer adds a
release in a RIF for independent policy reasons 43 or in settlement of
non-tort claims as well as any tort claims. 44
A recent tax case considering a RIF, and typical of them, is Taggi v.
United States. 45 AT&T terminated Taggi in a RIF and offered a
discrimination claims against her former employer. The court held that only the amount allocable
to the discrimination claim, as determined by the intent of the payor, was excludable. The court
allocated one-sixth of the settlement to that claim. Id. at 17-18.
41. Taggi v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 744, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), a/rd, 35 FJd 93 (2d Cir.
1994). In affirming, the Second Circuit emphasized the same point. "Where the issue is an
asserted exclusion from taxable income, it is imperative that a 'settlement agreement' involve a
bona lide dispute." Taggi v. United States, 35 FJd 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Galligan v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCI-I) 1669,1672 (1993) ("On the facts before us, we cannot conclude
that [employer) recognized any claims lor personal injuries, accorded them any weight whatsoever,
or allocated any portion of the consideration paid' pursuant to the agreement to settling such
claims."): Lindsey v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 488,492 (1993) ("Moreover, we do not
lind in the record of this case any evidence linking the subject payment ... , either directly or by
implication, to a personal injury tort claim asserted by petitioner against [employer). In fact, to
the contrary, petitioner's acknowledgement letter expressly states the opposite,"); Knuckles v.
Commissioncr, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1965) ("No proof was ever presented to [employer)
of the existence of any personal injuries from which it could evaluate a proper settlement.").
42. See Taggi, 835 F. Supp. at 746; Ray v. United States, 25 CI. Ct. 535, 537 (1992) (under
"intent of the payor" standard, employer intended to settle a contract action, not a tort action),
aff'd, 989 F.2d 1204 (Fed. Cif. 1993); Dible v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 556,558 (1989)
(where no evidence was presented that employer was aware of employee's threatened actions when
employee accepted RIF offer and executed general release, under "intent-ol~the-payor" standard,
no tort claims were asserted or settled); Whitehead v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 365,368
(1980) (employer's following of program settlement guidelines evidenced intent not to settle
taxpayer's individualized claims, tort or otherwise); Anderson v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH)
1206, 1207 (1979) (taxpayer made no tort claim); Gunderson v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH)
464, 465 (1979) (taxpayer made no tort claim). In the other RIF case, the taxpayer had made
claims but the court decided that none of the payment was allocable to them; the failure of the
settlement agreement to allocate any consideration to the tort claims was dispositive. Evans v.
Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 260, 263 (1980).
43. See Dible, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) at 558 (cmployer made payment in order to induce early
retirement).
44. See, e.g., Evans, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) at 263.
45. 835 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 35 FJd 93 (2d Cir. 1994).
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termination payment of either 3% or 5% of base pay times number of
years of service (up to twenty), with the higher payment conditioned
upon execution of a general release that expressly named employment
discrimination claims. 46 Taggi chose the higher amount, executed the
release, included the entire termination payment in income, and then
filed a claim for refund asserting that the incremental amount (2%) paid
by AT&T for the release was excludable from income as damages
received on account of age discrimination. 47 The district court agreed
with the Service's denial of the refund claim,48 and the Second Circuit
affirmed. 49 Both courts concluded that the payment was not damages
because Taggi asserted no age discrimination claim before he released
AT&T. 50
A clever attempt to succeed where Taggi failed came in Galligan v.
Commissioner. 51 Galligan and his employer disagreed about whether
his performance was satisfactory;S2 Galligan accepted a termination
payment and executed a general release. 53 Although Galligan asserted
no claims against his employer, he argued before the Tax Court that the
termination payment was damages received on account of age discrimination. 54 His argument was that an age discrimination claim was
created and compromised by the same event-the employer's

46. Id. at 745.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 746.
49. Taggi v. United States, 35 FJd 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1994).
50. Taggi, 835 F. Supp. at 746, aff'd, 35 FJd at 96. Alternatively, both courts concluded
that even if the payment was damages, the agreement's failure to allocate any consideration to an
age discrimination claim was fatal. Id. at 746-47, aff'd, 35 FJd at 97.
[P)laintitl's may not simply pick and choose between various potential claims included
in a general release tor the purpose of excluding the payment made lor that release
from gross income. Since the release was broad and inclusive, it encompassed any
claims plaintiff might have had for breach of contract as well as traditional tort-type
claims. Where a settlement agreement is silent as to what portion, if any, of a
settlement payment should be allocated towards damages excludable under 26 U.S.c.
§ 104(a)(2), the courts will not make that allocation for the parties.
Taggi, 835 F. Supp. at 746 (citing Villaume v. United States, 616 F. Supp. 185, 190 (D. Minn.
1985», aff'd. 35 F.3d at 96. Because of their conclusions that no claims were settled and even
if claims were settled, no consideration was allocable to them, the courts declined to reach the
issue of whether an ADEA claim is tort-like. Id. at 747; aff'd, 35 FJd at 97.
51. 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1669 (1993).
52. See id. at 1670.
53. Id.
54. fd. at 1672.
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proposing, and his accepting, the termination and release agreement. 55
The Tax Court gave short shrift to the argument:
Petitioner has failed to convince us that [employer's] agents had in mind age
discrimination. or some other tortious injury. any more than they had in mind
any other possible cause of action that petitioner might have initiated. If we
were to accept petitioner's argument, then any general release might, in
theory. be viewed to cover some potential claims for personal injuries. so as
to cause at least some of a related payment to be excludable under section
104(a)(2). The existence of an agreement that contains a release of undisclosed or potential claims is not sufficient evidence on its own that the
amounts paid under that agreement are eligible for section I04(a)(2) exclusion.'~

Galligan's case involved an individually negotiated termination, but
his argument raises a point which applies with substantially greater
force to RIF cases. While RIF termination agreements do not compromise preexisting age discrimination claims, the termination act itself
potentially gives rise to such claims, which the settlement preemptively
compromises. So phrased, RIFed employees who fall within the
protected groups of various employment discrimination statutes could
argue that an employment discrimination c1aim-even if never asserted
against the employer-is a necessary part of every RIF case in which
a general release is executed. The argument gathers greater strength
following enactment in October 1990 of the Older Workers Benefit
Protection ActS7 ("OWBPA"), which applied neither to Taggi nor to
Galligan.58 Enacted to make clear that the ADEA's prohibition against
age discrimination covers virtually all employee benefit plans and to
ensure that "older workers are not coerced or manipulated into waiving
their rights,,,S9 the OWBPA imposes threshold burdens on all ADEA
waivers, requiring, inter alia, the payment of consideration exceeding
that to which the releasor already was entitled by contract or law, and
expanding those burdens for waivers in group termination programs. 60 •

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990).
58. Both Taggi and Galligan released their employers in 1986. See Taggi v. United States.
835 F. Supp. 744, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1994); Galligan, 66 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 1670.
59. S. Rep. No. 263, IOlst Cong .. 2d Sess. 5 (1990). reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1509.
1510.
60. Id. at 32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1537-38:
Group termination and reduction programs stand in stark contrast to the individual
separation . . .. [T]he terms of the programs generally are. not subject to negotiation
between the parties. In addition, employees affected by these programs have little or
no basis to suspect that action is being taken based on their individual characteristics.
Indeed the employer generally advises them that the termination is nol a function of
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The ADEA waiver provisions therefore now contemplate that every
ADEA waiver is paid for, so some part of any termination consideration
paid pursuant to a waiver must be allocable to the ADEA waiver or that
waiver is not effective. Further, while the OWBPA's waiver provisions
expressly apply only to ADEA waivers, its principles have been used
to decide the effectiveness of waivers of other employment discrimination claims. Most circuit courts of appeal deciding the effectiveness of
a waiver of employment discrimination claims apply so-called "totality
of the circumstances" criteria, one factor of which is whether consideration was paid exceeding that to which the employee already was entitled
by contract or law. 61 Consequently, any time an older worker's
employment is terminated, and more generally any time a protectedgroup member's employment is terminated, and a release of employment discrimination claims is made, some consideration must be
allocable to the waiver.
The question of precisely who is protected by the employment
discrimination statutes is debated hotly. While discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
handicap, or age (if the employee is at least 40 years of age) is
prohibited,62 discrimination on those bases against majority group

their individual status.
61. From the cases deciding whether releases of employment discrimination claims are
binding, two analytical modes emerge: normal contract rules and "totality of the circumstances."
Under the more rigorous totality of the circumstances test,
[t]he factors considered incll!de the plaintiffs education and business experience, the
amount of time he or she had to consider the agreement, the clarity of the agreement.
whether the plaintiff consulted an attorney or had a fair opportunity to do so. whether
the employer encouraged or discouraged the employee to consult an attorney, and
whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeds the benetits to
which the employee was already entitled.
Gormin v. Brown-Forman Corp., 963 F.2d 323, 327 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Bormann v. AT&T
Communications, 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989», cert. denied, 493 U.S. 924 (1989). Besides
the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the test is also applied by the following circuits: Third, see
Coventry v. United States Steel, 856 F.2d 514, 523 (3d Cir. 1988). Fifth, see O'Hare v. Global
Natural Resources, Inc., 898 F.2d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1990), Ninth, see Stroman v. West Coast
Grocery, 884 F.2d 458, 462 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 854 (1990), Tenth, see Torrez
v. Public Servo Corp., 908 F.2d 687, 690 (10th Cir. 1990), and probably the Seventh. See Fortino
V. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that waiver was etl'ective under the
"totality of the circumstances," but saving for another case the decision whether to adopt the test).
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits apply less rigorous contract principles. entorcing waivers
if supported by consideration. See O'Shea V. Commercial Credit Corp .• 930 F.2d 358, 362 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied. 502 U.S. 859 (1991); Lancaster V. Buerkle Buick Honda Co .• 809 F.2d 539. 541
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987); Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp .. 787 F.2d
1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 1986).
62. See supra note 7.
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members, as a practical matter, may be permitted under other federal
statutory schemes. 63 Consequently, the protection for "any individual"
effectively is for "certain individuals who fall into a protected c1ass.,,64
The precise contours of the affirmative action defense to discrimination
claims of majority group members are unknown,65 but may safely be set
aside for our purposes. Important is the recognition that there is some
group of employees whose termination realistically canno~ contravene
an employment discrimination statute. I would define those unprotected-group members, the success of whose employment discrimination
claims is so unlikely as to be exotic, as "not-disabled, native-bornAmerican, white males less than 40 years of age not alleging religious
discrimination." Everyone else is a protected-group member. However,
granting that proposition-that a protected-group member's release
settles employment discrimination claims-satisfies only part one of the
three-part section 104(a)(2) test. The employees also must show that
the asserted employment discrimination claim is tort-like and, more
saliently, prove the portion of the payment allocable to that claim.
2. Are Employment Discrimination Claims Tort-like? Are Employment Discrimination Damages Received on Account of Personal as
Opposed to Economic Injuries?
.
The tax cases deciding whether money recovered under various
employment discrimination acts is excludable from income follow a
sinusoidal course, alternating between claims-focused and damagesfocused tests, and ultimately resting on a test combining both. 66 The

63. See RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 399 (1992).
64. See id. at 395-96.
65. See generally DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 99.11 (2d ed.
1980).
66. Nowhere is the sinusoidal course of analysis more evident than in the three decisions
rendered in O'Gilvie v. United States: The first was rendered before Burke, the second atter
Burke, and the third atter Sch/eier. Professor Kahn described the tirst oscillation when the district
court changed its decision on account of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Burke,
504 U.S. 229 (1992).
No more vivid example of [the etlect of Burke's exclusive focus on claims] can be
found than the two decisions of the federal district court of Kansas in 0 'Gi/vie 1 and
o 'Gilvie If. In 0 'Gi/vie I, the court, granting the government's motion tor summary
judgment, held punitive damages in a wrongful death action to be taxable because they
serve no compensatory purpose and therefore are not received "on account of personal
injury," as required by section 104(a)(2). 0 'Gi/vie 1 was decided the same day that the
Supreme Court promulgated its Burke decision. O'Gilvie moved for reconsideration
in light of Burke. In 0 'Gi/vie If, the court granted the motion and changed its decision
entirely. Relying on its reading of Burke, the court determined that it had erred in its
prior ruling by focusing on the nature ofthe punitive damage award, rather than on the
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Tax Court first decided that when physical. injuries are not involved,
section 104(a)(2) requires each damages component to be analyzed
separately,67 with the nonpecuniary loss components excludable and the
pecuniary loss components taxable. 68 Because no physical injuries are
involved in employment discrimination, the Tax Court, beginning with
Hodge v. Commissioner,69 applied this damages components analysis 70

nature of the underlying claim. Since the underlying claim was tort-type, the court
decided that "its previous order is contrary to Burke and must be reversed." Summary
judgment was granted for the taxpayer.
Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not to
Tax? 2 FLA. TAX REv. 327,362-63 (1995) (citing O'Gilvie v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH), 50,344, 70 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 92-5069 (D. Kan. 1992) (0 'Gilvie l) and O'Gilvie v. United
States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), 50,567,71 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 93-547 (D. Kan. 1992) (O'Gi/vie
If)).
The second oscillation occurred when the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court tollowing
the Supreme Court's decision in Schleier v, Commissioner, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995). The Tenth
Circuit interpreted Schleier to mean that punitive damages are not sutliciently caused by personal
injury to make them excludable. O'Gilvie v. United States, Nos. 94-3004,94-3031,94-3058,1995
WL 552053, at *6 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 1995) ("Thus Schleier made plain that Horton, and the
district court in the instant case, misconstrued Burke as holding that 104(a)(2) required only that
there be a tort-type injury.").
67. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.e. 1294, 1300 (1986) (,'Where, however, the damage
award is received for a nonphysical injury, we have previously mounted an inquiry to determine
whether the components of the injuries for which the award is made are personal or professional."), aiI'd, 848 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1988).
68. In a case involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.e. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. v 1993), which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, the Tax Court said that
we need not reach ... whether, as a matter of law, amounts recovered under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 may constitute personal injury damages within the meaning of sec.
104(a)(2). We have concluded that back pay recovered under the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is taxable; in the second issue of this case, we decided that the entire amount
recovered by the petitioner is, in fact, back pay. In the second issue, had we decided,
as a matter of fact, that a portion of the recovery constituted personal injury damages
instead of back pay, we would have also had to decide whether such recovery was
excludable from gross income under sec. 104(a)(2).
Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.e. 616,619 n.7 (1975).
The Tax Court's analysis in Hodge-concluding that one component of a racial discrimination
award !lnder Title VII, back pay, was taxable, and leaving open whether other components might
be excludable-effectively views each component of damages as a separate claim. In a later case.
the Tax Court phrased the issue precisely that way: "The determinative inquiry here involves the
characterization of the nature of petitioner's liquidated damages claim." Rickel v. Commissioner,
92 T.e. 510, 518 (1989), rev'd, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990). Although the Tax Court protessed
to apply the component analysis to employment discrimination claims, exceptions existed. See
infra text accompanying notes 121-127.
69. 64 T.e. 616 (1975).
70. Id. at 620-21. In some circumstances. employment discrimination remedies are limited
to wage loss (called "back pay") and liquidated damages equal to back pay. See 29 U.s.e. §
216(b) (1988). Availability of liquidated damages sometimes turns on the mental state of the

HeinOnline -- 44 U. Kan. L. Rev. 115 1995-1996

116

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

and concluded that back pay (the actual wage losses arising from the
discriminatory employment action) was taxable, but that liquidated
damages (which sometimes are awarded in an amount equal to back
pa/ I ) were excludable. 72 Next, while the Fourth Circuit appeared to
agree with the Tax Court's components analysis,73 other courts of
appeal rejected the approach. They wrote that the component approach
confuses the nature of a claim with its consequences (the components
of its reliet), and thus concluded that whenever a claim arises under a
statute, the claim is tort-like, for the duty arises by operation of law
rather than express or implied contract. 74 Consequently, the near-

defendant. See id. ~ 626(b) ("liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful
violations"); see also id. ~~ 215(a)(3). 216 (prescribing liquidated damages as partial remedy for
discharge of or discrimination against 'an employee because they have launched Chapter 8
proceedings).
Employment discrimination statutes also typically include the remedy of
reinstatement, see, e.g., id. ~ 216(b); 42 U.S.e. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1993), and ollen money,
called "front pay," is awarded in lieu of reinstatement. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL.. CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 1070 (3d ed. 1994). In addition, attorneys'
fees arc awarded to the prevailing party, prejudgment interest is paid, and the court is authorized
to grant injunctive relief. See, e.g., ~ 2000e-5(g).
71. See 29 U.s.e. § 216(b) (1988).
72. Hodge, 64 T.e. at 619 (Title VII back pay taxable); see also Thompson v. Commissioner,
89 T.e. 632, 648 (1987) (back pay under Equal Pay Act taxable; liquidated damages under Equal
Pay Act excludable), aff'd, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); Rickel, 92 T.C. at 521-22 (ADEA back
pay taxable; ADEA liquidated damages excludable», aifd in part and rev 'd in part, 900 F.2d 655
(3d Cir. 1990), overruled by Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.e. 150 (1991); Wirtz v. Commissioner, 56 T.e.M. (CCH) 1596, 1598 (1989) (ADEA front pay taxable); Sparrow v. Commissioner, 57
T.C.M. (CCH) 816,821 (1989) (title VII front pay taxable), aff'd, 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3009 (1992).
73. See Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709. 712 (1989) ("[W]e conclude that
Thompson received the liquidated damages through prosecution of a tort-type claim lor personal
injuries. We conclude, however, that the claim for back pay was essentially a contractual claim
for accrued wages.").
74. See, e.g., Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F,2d 211, 215 (3d Cir. 1989) ("This duty [against
unlawful employment discrimination] is independent of any duty an employer might owe his
employee pursuant to an express or implied employment contract; it arises by operation of law.
Thus, the statutory claim seeks to remedy a statutory violation that the law has detined as
wrongful." (footnote omitted»; Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1990)
("Reviewing the nature of Pistillo's claim, we conclude that his age discrimination lawsuit is
analogous to the assertion of a tort-type right to redress personal injuries. [Employer]
discriminated against Pistillo on the basis of his age and invaded the rights Pistillo . is granted by
virtue of being a person in the sight of the law.' Contrary to the arguments of the Commissioner,
Pistillo has not brought separate actions to seek back pay damages lor his pain and sutlering.")
(citing Threlkeld. 87 T.e. 1294, \308 (1986»; Redtield v. Insurance Co. ofN. Am .. 940 F.2d 542.
546 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Nothing in the ADEA retlects a congressional attempt to rewrite the terms
of employment contracts. ADEA actions are analogous to other lederal discrimination causes of
action, many of which have been described in explicitly tort-like language." (citations omitted».
The Third Circuit stridently rejected the components analysis of the Tax Court and the Service:
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uniform rule of the circuits was to exclude all damages recovered on
account of employment discrimination claims. Later, the Tax Court
confessed error in the components analysis, agreed with the circuit
courts that section 104(a)(2) depends on a claims analysis, and reversed
itself.7s Next, the Supreme Court in United States v. Burke76 seemingly
agreed with the circuit courts' nature-of-the-c1aim focus when it
concluded that a claim is tort-like only if it provides broad remedial
components consistent with "traditional tort liability.,,77 Sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, religion, and
national origin, the Court concluded, was not tort-like because Title VII
then limited remedies to back pay.78

[O]nce it found that age discrimination was analogous to a personal injury and that the
taxpayer's ADEA action amounted to the assertion of a tort type right. the Tax Court
should have ended its analysis and found that all damages flowing therefrom were
excludable under § 104(a)(2). By going further and rummaging through the taxpayer's
prayers for relief in order to determine the nature of his claim. the Tax Court was
simply defining the nature of the taxpayer's injury by reference to its nonpersonal
consequences, an approach we explicitly rejected in both Bent and Byrne. and the full
Tax Court rejected in Threlkeld . . .. Thus, to the extent that the Commissioner, in
spending an inordinately large part of his brief attempting to establish that at least half
of the settlement comprised payment for back pay, is arguing that 'because the
settlement was intended to compensate [the taxpayer] for economic losses it is therelore
compensating (him] for non-personal injuries, we find this argument to have been
rejected in Ben! [and Byrne] and we reject it again here' for the third time.
Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 661-62, 662 n.9 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Byrne, 883 F.2d
at 214), rev'g 92 T.C. 510 (1989).
75. See Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.e. 150, 161 (Downey I) ("Although the direction of
the necessary inquiry would seem straightforward, some confusion has arisen in the past when the
focus has shifted from the source and character of the injury (a tortious invasion of personal rights)
to its consequences. Those consequences are irrelevant for purposes of the inquiry required by
section 104(a)(2)." (citations omitted)), aff"d on reh 'g, 100 T.e. 634 (1993) (Downey 11), rev 'd,
33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995). In Downey I, the Tax Court
concluded that ADEA damages are "damages received on account of personal injury." and
consequently not included in the recipient's gross income. 97 T.e. at 165-66.
76. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
77. See id. at 237 ("We thus agree with the Court of Appeals' analysis insofar as it focused.
tor purposes of § 104(a)(2), on the nature of the claim underlying respondents' damages award.")
(citing Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119. 1121 (6th Cir. 1991)).
78. Id. at 238. The Court noted that Title VII "limits available remedies to back pay.
injunctions, and other equitable relief." Id. The "injunctions and other equitable reliet" a're the
source of power for courts to order reinstatement or monetary relief in lieu of reinstatement, which
sometimes is called "front pay." See supra note 70. Consequently. to keep consistent the
discussion, 1 say that Title VII then was limited to back pay and front pay, leaving aside (as not
meaningful to the ensuing analysis) the additional remedies of interest, attorneys' fees, and
ancillary injunctive relief. See. e.g., Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus., 953 F.2d 1277. 1281 (11th
Cir. 1992) (discussing attorney fee remedy). See generally 2 SULLIVAN E'f AL., supra note 4. §
14.1 (1988) (discussing broad remedial scope of Title VII's back pay provisions).
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Under the circuit courts' nature-of-the-c1aim test, remedial components are considered only at the threshold-to decide whether a claim
is tort-like-but once the nature of the claim is decided, all components
rise and fall together as either all taxable or all not taxable. In Burke,
the Court did not address that aspect, for it concluded that the claim
was not tort-like, but the Court strongly implied that if broad remedies
were available, all damages recovered would be excludable. 79 Following Burke, the Service and every court deciding the issue (except one
district court), including· the Tax Court, three federal circuit courts of
appeal, and five federal district courts, all read Burke to hold that once
a claim is judged "tort-like" under Burke, all components of its relief
are excluded from income. 8o The only extent of their disagreement was
how broad remedies had to be before the underlying claim achieved
"tort-like" status. 81

79. Burke contrasted Title VII with 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (prohibiting
race-based employment discrimination) and with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
(prohibiting housing discrimination). noting that § 1981 and Title VIII provide for awards of
compensatory and punitive damages. while Title VII awards only back pay. and thereby implying
that employment discrimination claims for which broad damages are available are tort-like. Bllrke.
504 U.S. at 240.
80. See infra notes 71 and 98; Rev. RuL 93-88. 1993-2 C.B. 61. suspended by I.R.S. Notice
95-45. 1995-34 I.R.B. 20. Sometimes the Service applied pure components analysis in § 104{a)(2)
cases. In Technical Advice Memorandum 93-48-002. the Service concluded that payments
received were not excludable under § 104(a)(2) because they compensated for lost income. The
ruling made little. if any. attempt to discern the claim underlying the payment. much less any
attempt to decide whether such claim is a tort. and thereby implicitly applied a pure components
analysis to a § 104(a)(2) question. See Tech Adv. Mem. 93-48-002 (Dec. 3. 1993). available in
Westlaw. FTX-ALL Database.
Most commentary written after Burke also agreed that once the tort-like nature of the claim was
shown. all damages were excludable without further inquiry. Arthur W. Andrews. The Taxation
of Title VIJ Victims After the Civil Rights Act of 1991,46 TAX LAW. 755.772,774 n.154 (1993)
(reading Burke to have a pure claims focus, but adding that. specifically with employment
discrimination, the identification of the "claims" may be such that a Title VII back pay claim is
separate from a § 1981 a claim, even when both arise from the same discrimination); Mary L
Heen. An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of Employment Discrimination Recoveries Under
Federal Civil Rights Statutes: Income from Human Capital. Realization. and Nonrecognition. 72
N.C. L REV. 549.599-600 (1994) (suggesting that Burke will be read to have a pure claims focus.
but could also have a specific case focus; that is, a court might conclude that. although amended
, Title VII is tort-like. a plaintiff who recovers only back pay may be taxed): Kahn. supra note 66.
at 361. For pre-Burke commentary. see Heen, supra. at 561-64 and sources cited in notes 65-76.
81. Burke created a two-pronged test for § 104{a)(2) purposes: (I) the claim must be tor
personal injury, and (2) the remedies must be tort-like (i.e., broad). "In order to come within the
§ 104(a)(2) income exclusion, respondents therefore must show that Title VII. the legal basis for
their recovery of backpay. redresses a tort-like personal injury in accord with the foregoing
principles." Burke, 504 U.S. at 237. The contours of the first prong are not clear. but can be put
aside, because Burke made clear that employment discrimination is a personal injury for this
purpose: "No doubt discrimination could constitute a 'personal injury' for purposes of § 104{a)(2)
if the relevant cause of action evidenced a tort-like conception of injury and remedy." Id. at 239.
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Most recently in Commissioner v. Schleier,82 the Court rejected
Burke's implication. It decoupled the nature-of-the-claim and components analyses, holding that the nature-of-the-claim test is but the first
prong of a two-pronged test. 83 Under the second prong, the taxpayer,
using principles of proximate causation, must show that the damages
were received "on account of personal injur[y] or sickness."R4

The issue in Burke was whether under Title VII the concededly personal injury of discrimination
was remedied in a tortclike manner. Consequently, in deciding the application of 104(a)(2) to
other employment discrimination claims, only the second prong-whether remedies are
broad-needs to be examined.
Without the first prong, all torts would fall within the exclusion, including tort recoveries by
corporations for interference with contract, hardly a "personal injury." Deciding a limiting
principle, however, will prove ditlicult. For instance, in Every v. United States, commercial
salmon fishermen settled claims "against Exxon for damages suffered as a result of the Exxon
Valdez oil spill in Cook Inlet, Alaska." Every v. United States. No. C93-5648S, 1994 WL 597137,
at "I (W.D. Wash. July 19, 1994), a.U'·d, 51 FJd 279 (9th Cir. 1995). The court did not identify
the claims, summarily dismissing the plaintitl's' argument for application of 104(a)(2) as follows:
I conclude that while the claim clearly sounded in tort, the settlement amount did not
arise from an injury to the person in the traditional tort sense. It is economic in nature
to redress the loss of plaintiffs' livelihood from fishing. The case is more analogous
to the hypothetical loss suffered by one who has a license to farm a plot of limd and
whose crop is destroyed by a crop duster negligently using DDT. While such a claim
sounds in tort, no one could seriously argue that recovery of damages in such a case
would be excludable under section 104(a)(2).
Id. The court decided the case entirely on the basis that the damages were in lieu of something
that would be taxable income had the tort not occurred. But the "in lieu of what" test does not
decide a 104(a)(2) case. After Burke, the court must examine the c1aim_s and decide if (I) the
claim is for personal injury, and (2) the remedies are tort-like.
82. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
83. "[S]atisfaction of Burke's 'tort or tort type' inquiry is a necessary condition for
excludability[;] ... it is not a sutlicient condition." Id. at 2167.
84. Id. "First, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the underlying cause of action giving rise
to the recovery is 'based upon tort or tort type rights'; and second, the taxpayer must show that
the damages were received 'on account of personal injuries or sickness ...· Id. The Court held that
neither ADEA back pay nor ADEA liquidated damages met either of the "two independent
requirementS that a taxpayer must meet before a recovery may be excluded under
104(a)(2)."
Id. Although not cited by the Court, the first decision to apply proximate, or sufficient. causation
principles to deciding whether damages are received on account of personal injury was Judge
Murnaghan's opinion in Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 589-90 (4th Cir. 1990). Judge
Murnaghan illustrated the point as follows:
Baltimore Orioles pitcher Jim Palmer's recent induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame
illustrates. in a non-legal context, the ditliculty with the Tax Court's conclusion that "on
account of' plainly suggests but-for causation. It is certainly true that being associated
with baseball is a prerequisite or a but-for cause to Hall of Fame induction. However,
it would seem to strain ordinary usage to say that Palmer was inducted "on account of'
his being associated with baseball. It would be equally if not more natural to employ
a sutlicient causation approach and say that Palmer was inducted "on account of' his
superb career as a Major League baseball player.

*

*

*

*
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Schleier, therefore, brings the analysis full-circle. We began with the
Tax Court (at least in nonphysical' injury cases) focusing purely on
damages components individually without regard to the claims from
which they arose, and excluding only the nonpecuniary damages
components;85 courts of appeal rejected the components focus, focused
on the nature of the claim (statute = tort), and excluded all damages if
the claim was tort-like;86 the Supreme Court agreed with the focus on
the claim,87 but later held that section 104(a)(2) contains both a claimsfocused prong and a pure-damages-focused prong. 88
Now we apparently consider damages components for two independent purposes. Under Burke, for each claim, we examine the
aggregate damages components possibly recoverable under the claim
and decide whether they "evidence[] a tort-like conception of injury and
remedy.,,89 If the claim is not tort-like, no damages actually recovered
are excludable, as was held in Burke. If the claim is tort-like under
Burke, then under Schleier, we individually examine the damages
components actually recovered and test whether each is received "on
account of personal injur[y].,,9o
a. The Claims-Focused Prong (The Burke Prong)
Under the Burke prong, which Schleier affinned and made the first
prong of the two-pronged section 104(a)(2) test, the taxpayer must
demonstrate that the underlying cause of action giving rise to the
recovery permits recovery of broad "tort-like" remedies. 91 According
to Burke, traditional tort liability includes damages for lost wages,
medical expenses, diminished future earning capacity, emotional
distress, pain and suffering, impairment of reputation and standing in
the community, personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering, and
where the defendant's misconduct was intentional or reckless, punitive
or exemplary damages.92

Miller. 914 F.2d at 590 n.7. In Miller, the Fourth Circuit concluded that punitive damages are not
received on account of personal injury and consequently are not excludable from income under
§ 104(a)(2). Miller has been followed by four other circuit courts. See infra note 104.
85. See slIpra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
86. See slIpra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
87. See slIpra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
88. See slIpra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
89. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,239 (1992).
90. Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 (1995) ("The critical point this
hypothetical illustrates is that each element of the settlement is recoverable not simply because the
taxpayer received a tort settlement, but rather because each element of the settlement satisfies the
requirement ... that the damages were received 'on account of personal injuries or sickness. "').
91. Burke, 504 U.S. at 234-37; Schieier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166-67.
92. Bllrke, 504 U.S. at 235-37.
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A threshold issue in applying Burke is how broad remedies must be
to "evidence[] a tort-like conception of injury and remedy.,,93 In Burke,
the Court opined, "No doubt discrimination could constitute a 'personal
injury' for purposes of § 104(a)(2) if the relevant cause of action
evidenced a tort-like conception of injury and remedy.,,94 For reasons
that will later become clear, the testing ground for applying Burke was
the ADEA. ADEA claims do not fit neatly within common law
classifications; as statutorily created causes of action, they resemble
torts, but unlike most statutory tort causes of action (which are silent on
damages and thereby incorporate broad common law tort remedies), the
ADEA provides its own more narrow remedies. Although the ADEA
makes available such "legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate,"95
the incorporation into the ADEA of the remedial provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act 96 limits the damages which may be awarded in
ADEA actions to back pay, and if the violation is willful, liquidated
damages equal to back pay. 97
All ten courts considering ADEA exclusions after Burke (and before
Schleier) concluded that Burke requires only some, and not all,
components of traditional tort liability for a claim to be tort-like; in fact,
those courts read Burke to require only a single component of relief
resembling traditional tort liability.98 Those courts disagreed, however,

93. Id. at 239.
94. Id.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
96. The enforcement section of the ADEA, 29 U.s.C. § 626 (1988 & Supp. v 1993),
incorporates the enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-219
(1988 & Supp. v 1993). Section 626(a) of the ADEA states that "[t)he provisions of this chapter
shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections
211 (b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of this
section." 29 U.S.c. § 626(a) (1988 & Supp. v 1993). Sections 211(b), 216, and 217 of Title 29
are enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, of which § 216 sets forth the remedies
available under the FLSA. It provides that employers who violate the minimum wage and
overtime requirements of the FLSA are liable to the affected employees for "unpaid minimum
wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages." 29 U.S.e. § 216 (1988 & Supp. v 1993).
97. E.g., Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 2576 (1995); Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus., 953 F.2d 1277, 1204 (11th Cir. 1992). See
generally 2 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 20.11.1 (1988) (First through Tenth Circuits deny
damages other than back pay and liquidated damages in ADEA cases).
98. Prior to Burke, the three courts of appeals deciding the issue, and ultimately the Tax
Court as well, decided that ADEA claims were tort-like because they arise under a statute. See
Redfield v. Insurance Co. ofN. Am., 940 F.2d 542. 545 (9th Cir. 1991); Pistillo v. Commissioner,
912 F.2d 145, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1990); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 658-61 (3d Cir.
1990); Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.e. 150, 165 (1991) (Downey I), modified, 100 T.e. 634
(1993) (Downey II), rev'd, 33 FJd 836 (7th Cir. 1994), cerf. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (\995).
Burke rejected that analysis, and focused instead on the remedies available for a claim.
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on whether the liquidated damages component of ADEA relief
resembles traditional tort damages. Those that found that ADEA
liquidated damages were tort-type damages almost uniformly concluded
that the ADEA evidences a "tort-like conception of injury and remedy.,,99 Only the Northern District of Illinois in Drase v. United States 100
saw the question as one of degree. It concluded that while liquidated
damages are tort-type punitive damages, they are but one type of a
"long litany of damages recoverable in tort" and insufficient to make
ADEA a tort. IOI
The Supreme' Court in Schleier appeared to adopt the Drase analysis:
Like the pre-1991 version of Title VII, the ADEA provides no compensation
"for any of the other traditional harms associated with personal injury."
Monetary remedies under the ADEA are limited to back wages, .which are
clearly of an "economic character," and liquidated damages, which we have
already noted serve no compensatory function. Thus. though this is a closer
case than Burke, we conclude that a recovery under the ADEA is not one that
is "based upon tort or tort type rightS.',llll

Consequently, the ADEA decisions required reconsideration after Burke; the Tax Court and nine
other courts decided the issue. Decisions of the Fifth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, Tax Court, Court of
Federal Claims, Eastern District of California. and District of New Jersey concluded that damages
received on account of ADEA claims are excludable from income. See Purcell v. Sequin State
Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 961 (5th Cir. 1993); Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 794
(9th Cir. 1994), vacated. 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995); Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634,637
(1993) (Downey II), rev'd, 33 FJd 836 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995);
Bennett v. United States. 30 Fed. CI. 396, 399 (1994), rev'd, 60 FJd 843 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Rice
v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 1241, 1245 (E.D. Cal. 1993). aff'd, 35 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 1994),
vacated sub nom. Commissioner v. Schmitz, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995); Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc ..
841 F. Supp. 584,596 (D.NJ. 1994), aff'd, 50 F.3d 1204 (3dCir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit.
two district courts in the Eleventh Circuit, and a District Court in Illinois. which rendered its
decision two weeks before the Seventh Circuit's decision in another ADEA case, concluded
otherwise. See Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 1994); Shaw v. United
States. 853 F. Supp. 1378, 1382 (M.D, Ala. 1994); Maleszewski v. United States, 827 F. Supp.
1553,1556 (N.D. Fla. 1993); Drase v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 1077,1079 (N.D. III. 1994).
Additionally, the General Counsel of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission opined that
under the Burke analysis, ADEA damages are excludable from income. Memorandum from
Donald R. Livingston, EEOC General Counsel, to Regional Attorneys (Feb. 22. 1993), reprinted
in 34 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-I (Feb. 23, 1993), available in Westlaw. BNA-DLR Database.
Within approximately one week, however, he rescinded that conclusion "pursuant to the view of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue." Memorandum from Donald R. Livingston, EEOC
General Counsel, to Regional Attorneys (Mar. I, 1993), reprinted in 41 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
F-I (March 4, 1993), available in Westlaw, BNA-DLR Database.
99. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,239 (1992).
100. 866 F. Supp. 1077 (N.D. III. 1994).
101. Id. at 1079-80 (quoting Burke. 504 U.S. at 238). Two weeks after Drase was decided.
the Seventh Circuit decided Downey and held ADEA damages outside the exclusion because
ADEA liquidated damages are contract-type damages. See Downey, 33 F.3d at 840.
102. Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 (1995).
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Schleier's discussion of the Burke prong is conclusory; consequently, we
still do not know how broad the damages must be before the claim
achieves "tort-like" status. We know only that (1) back pay only and
(2) back pay, liquidated damages equal to back pay, and a jury trial are
not sufficiently broad.
b. The Pure-Damages-Components-Focused "Causation" Prong (The
Schleier Prong)
While the first prong of the section 104(a)(2) test, the Burke prong,
focuses on the aggregate of the remedies potentially available for the
claim, the second prong, the Schleier prong, focuses on the damages
actually recovered, and applies proximate causation to decide whether
each component is "received on account of personal injury.,,103 The
logic of the Schleier prong, as noted by Justice O'Connor in dissent, is
"rather hard to follow.,,104 Because the analysis was not developed in
lower federal courts or earlier Supreme Court cases, we have only the
one-paragraph analysis in the opinion. The Court illustrated the causal
link as follows.
In an automobile accident, "the accident causes a persorial injury
which in tum causes a loss of wages." 105 In an age discrimination case,
on the other hand, "the discrimination causes both personal injury and
loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other.,,106 So, while automobile accidents proximately cause loss of wages, and while age discrimination causes loss of wages, with discrimination there exists some
intervening, more proximate cause of the loss of wages. 107 The Court
offered two possible causes of Schleier's lost wages more proximate
than age discrimination: Plaintiffs 60th birthday, or plaintiffs being
laid off (the passive construction is the Court's; this was an immaculate
firing-it happened, but not because of age discrimination). 108
According to the Court, neither turning age 60 nor being fired are
personal injuries; feeling bad about turning age 60 (the Court really said
that the legally relevant cause of the plaintiffs injury was his 60th
birthday) or feeling bad about being fired for age discrimination are
personal injuries, but no part of an ADEA recovery compensates for
feeling bad about being discriminated against. 109

103.
·104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

ld. at 2166-67.
ld. at 2170.
M at 2164.
ld.
See id.
ld.
See id.
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It strains the imagination to say that while age discrimination caused
plaintiffs loss of wages, plaintiffs "being fired" (by whom and why, we
may ask) was a closer, independent, and more proximate cause
sufficient to make age discrimination no longer a legally relevant cause
of plaintiffs lost wages. Remeinber, a defendant is liable under the
ADEA only if the defendant takes some adverse employment action
against the plaintiff, like reducing his payor firing him on account of
age. Yet, when we consider taxation, somehow the loss of wages was
not "caused" by the age discrimination. If that really is true, the
defendant is not liable under the ADEA-because the event of his
birthday, or his "being fired" (and not the age discrimination), caused
his loss of wages. 110 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that ADEA back
pay was not received on account of personal injury, but on account of
"being fired" or "attaining the age of 60."111
The Schleier Court also concluded that ADEA liquidated damages
were not received "on account of personal injury.,,112 The cause of the
liquidated damages was discerned' from the congressional purpose in
enacting the ADEA, which disclosed that (I) those damages exist to
punish the defendant, and (2) even to the extent they remedy rather than
punish, they "do[] not necessarily" 113 compensate for injuries that are
"personal rather than economic.""4 According to the Court, neither
damages received to punish the defendant l15 nor damages received to

110. Professor Paul Gudel comprehensively discusses the causal relation between "discriminatory animus," "motivating factor," and "employment action" requisite to liability under the
employment discrimination statutes in light of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Paul 1. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of
Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17,
68-70 (1991).
III. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2164.
112. Id.at2165.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Whether punitive damages recovered in a personal injury tort action are excluded from
income under ~ 104(a)(2) is another great open question. After amendment in 1989, ~ 104(a)
provides that the ~ 104(a)(2) exclusion "shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection
with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness." I.R.C. ~ 104(a) (Supp. V 1993).
The 1989 amendment thereby expressly extricates from the exclusion punitive damages recovered
in a post-1989 personal injury case not involving physical injury or physical sickness. Courts
disagree on the state of pre-amendment law. The Tax Court and Sixth Circuit say that pre-1989
personal injury punitive damages are excludable. see Miller v. Commissioner. 93 T.e. 330. 341
(1989) (reviewed by the court), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990); Horton v. Commissioner. 33
FJd 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1994). but the Fourth. Fifth. Ninth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits say they
'are not. See Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586. 590 (4th Cir. 1990); Wesson v. United States.
48 FJd 894, 895,900-01 (5th Cir. 1995); Hawkins v. United States. 30 FJd 1077, 1084 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995); O'Gilvie v. United States. Nos. 94-3004. 94-3031.943058, 1995 WL 552053, at ·6 (10th Cir. Sept. 19. 1995); Reese v. United States. 24 F.3d 228, 235
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remedy economic injuries are damages received "on account of personal
injury.,,116
In this pure-damages-focused prong, the Court appears to be trying
to distinguish, for section 104(a)(2) purposes, personal injuries from
economic injuries, but precedent prohibits it from expressly doing so.
A result searches for a reason.
If section I04(a)(2) really does not extend to economic injuries, then
recovery of lost wages should be taxable in all cases, including
automobile accident cases and discrimination cases. But that broad rule
is not available, because everyone, even the Court, assumes that lost
wages recovered in automobile accident cases are excludable. I 17
Consequently, the Court, as have others in the past, struggled for a
reason to distinguish lost wages in automobile accidents from those in
employment discrimination cases. It decided upon proximate causation.
Earlier, the Tax Court had used the absence of physical injury in
discrimination cases to distinguish employment discrimination cases
from intentional torts, but the physical/nonphysical distinction was not

(Fed. Cir. 1994). In Schleier, the Court held that pre-1989 punitive damages are not excludable
in a case not involving physical injury. See lIS S. Ct. at 2165 (refusing to exclude Schleier's
liquidated damages because, in part, "Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive")
(quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. III, 126 (1985)).
Yet to be decided is the effect of the 1989 amendment on post-1989 physical injury or
sickness-based punitive damages. For even if pre-1989 punitive damages are not excludable, the
1989 amendment's exclusion (of post-1989 non-physical injury or sickness-based punitive
damages) from the exclusion may imply an inclusion of post-1989 physical injury or sicknessbased punitive damages in the exclusion. This so-called question of whether the 1989 amendment
has both an "inclusionary component" as well as an "exclusionary component." while not the
subject of a decision, is the subject of commentary. See generally Kahn, supra note 66, at 367.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,236 n.6 (1992), and several courts
citing Burke, e.g., Horton, 33 F.3d at 631, suggest that the 1989 amendment includes physical
injury or sickness-based punitive damages'with the exclusion. Commentators agree and disagree.
Compare Andrews, supra note 80 (post-I 989 physical injury or sickness-based punitive damages
are excludable) with Kahn, supra, at 376-77 (pre- and post-1989 punitive damages should not be
excludable); James M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143. 188 (1992) (prior to
Burke, arguing that pre- and post-1989 punitive damages and damages for none~onomic harms
should not be excludable). In Schleier, the Court noted the 1989 amendment, but made no
mention of its effect on the decision. Schleier, lIS S. Ct. at 2163 n.3: see also Robert Wood,
Schleier Strikes Taxpayers Three Times, 68 TAX NOTES 475 (1995) (noting Schleier's implication
that all punitive damages are taxable, and raising the question of how to define punitive damages)
(citing F. Philip Manns, Jr., When Does the Payment of Damages Punish the Payor?, 66 TAX
NOTES 276 (1995)).
116. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2165.
1l7. Some commentators examining the tax theories underlying ~ 104(a)(2) have suggested
that under "human capital" theories, all wage recoveries should be taxable if they were calculated
on a pre-tax basis when awarded. Heen, supra note 80, at 614; Dodge, supra note lIS, at 165
(1992). No court has held that lost wages in a physical injury are not excludable.
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available to the Court, because Burke rejected it. IIS The D.C. Circuit,
in Sparrow v. Commissioner,119 seized on the ancient distinction of
damages and equitable relief, finding back pay recovered in an
employment discrimination claim was taxable equitable relief, rather
than damages recovered fot a common law tort. 120
All of the attempts to explain why lost wages in discrimination cases
are different from lost wages in automobile accident cases have had
problems. For instance, while the Tax Court professed to apply its
components analysis to employment discrimjnation claims, exceptions
existed. In Bent v. Commissioner, 121 Bent sued his former employer, a
public school district, for violating Bent's constitutional right to free
speech in firing him for something he said. 122 The case was settled
after the trial court held that the school district had abridged Bent's
freedom of speech in violation of 42 U.S.c. § 1983. 123 Bent's proof of
damages included lost wages, medical expenses, and general damages,124 and the Tax Court concluded that the entire amount received was
excludable~ 125 It "conclude[d] that the element of lost wages was not
an independent basis for recovery but only an evidentiary factor in
determining the amount by which petitioner was damaged." 126 The
court never reasoned how lost wages were a "claim" in one case and a
mere evidentiary factor in another, or why recoveries under section
1983 are more like automobile accident cases than recoveries under the
employment discrimination acts. Professor Morgan harmonized the Tax

118. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2164 n.4 ("Though the text of § 104(a)(2) might be considered
ambiguous on this point, it is by now clear that § 104(a)(2) encompasses recoveries based on
intangible as well as tangible harms.") (citing Burke, 504 U.S. at 235 n.6.); Burke, 504 U.S. 229:
Although the IRS briefly interpreted § 104(a)(2)'s statutory predecessor ... to restrict
the scope of personal injuries to physical injuries, the courts and the IRS long since
have recognized that § 104(a)(2),s reference to "personal injuries" encompasses, in
accord with common judicial parlance and conceptions nonphysical injuries to the
individual, such as those affecting emotions, reputation, or character, as well. ...

Notwithstanding Justice SCALIA's contention in his separate opinion that the term
"personal injuries" must be read as limited to "health"-related injuries, the foregoing
authorities establish that § 104(a)(2) in fact encompasses a broad range of physical and
nonphysical injuries to personal interests.
Id. at 235-36 n.6 (citations omitted).
119. 949 F.2d 434 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3009 (1992).
120. See id. at 437-38.
121. 87 T.C. 236 (1986), afj"d, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
122. Id. at 240-41.
123. Id. at 243.
124. See id. at 241.
125. Id. at 243.
126. Id. at 251.
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Court cases in the only way they could be: "[A]ny recovery that is
purely for back pay will be found taxable." 127
There is little reason to believe that the Court's attempt to explain
why lost wages in discrimination cases are different from those in
automobile accident cases will fare any better. Recoveries under the
racial discrimination statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, expose the difficulty.
In Burke, the Court unambiguously distinguished section 1981 and
unamended Title VII:
Indeed, the circumscribed remedies available under Title VII stand in marked
contrast not only to those available under traditional tort law, but under other
federal antidiscrimination statutes, as well. For example ... 42 U.S.c. §
1981, permits victims of race-based employment discrimination to obtain a
jury trial at which "both equitable and legal relief. including compensatory
and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages" may be awarded. The
Court similarly has observed that Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
whose fair housing provisions allow for jury trials and for awards of
compensatory and punitive damages, "sounds basically in tort" and "contrasts
sharply" with the relief available under Title VIJ. '2K

Unless Burke is repudiated, we must conclude that section 1981 is
tort-like under the Burke prong. How does the Schleier prong apply?
Under section 1981, lost wages form part of the compensatory damages
recoverable by the plaintiff, in addition to damages for nonpecuniary
harms, like loss of dignity.129 Do we apply a pure-damages-components
analysis, because "being fired" caused ·the loss rather than racial
discrimination, or do we treat section 1981 like an automobile accident
case?
Similarly, the damages recoverable under the employment discrimination statutes were broadened significantly by the Civil Rights Act of
1991. A new section, 42 U.S.c. § 1981a, applies concurrently with and
in addition to Title VII. 130 It permits recovery of "compensatory and
punitive damages," 131 subject to aggregate limits of between $50,000
and $300,000, depending on the size of the employer,132 for (1)
"unlawful intentional discrimination" in employment on the basis of
race, sex, religion, and national origin under Title VII 133 and (2)

127. Patricia T. Morgan, Old Torts. Nell' Torts and Taxes: The Still Uncertain Scope of
Section 104(0)(2),48 LA. L. REV. 875,916 (1988).
128. United States v. Burke. 504 U.S. 229,240 (1992) (tootnote and citation omitted).
129. See. e.g.. Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc .. 832 F.2d 194.204-05 (1st Cir. 1987).
130. 42 U.S.C. ~ 1981 a (Supp. V 1993).
131. Id ~ 198Ia(a)(I).
132. Id § 198Ia(b)(3)(AHD).
133. Id ~ 198Ia(a)(l); 42 U.S.C. ~ 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). These practices. comprising
"disparate treatment," are distinguished from "disparate impact"" practices in that the former require
discriminatory intent; the latter do not. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins. 113 S. Ct. 1701. 1705
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Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") disparate treatment claims. 134
Additionally, a jury trial is available for section 1981 a claims.135
After Burke but before Schleier, the Service in Revenue Ruling 93-88
acknowledged exclusion for all amounts recovered under (I) Title vn
gender-based disparate treatment claims as amended by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991,136 (2) Title VII racial discrimination claims as amended,137
and (3) Americans With Disabilities Act c1aims,138 because the claims,
as amended, gave rise to sufficiently broad remedies to be tort-like.
The ruling based itself on the Court's dicta in Burke,139 in which the
Court implied that all damages recovered under section 1981 would be
excludable. Thus, before Schleier the testing ground for applying Burke
was the ADEA, because exclusion for virtually all other employment
discrimination recoveries had been conceded. Following the decision
in Schleier, the Service suspended Revenue Ruling 93-88 and requested
public comment concerning Schleier's effect on the ruling.140
How does Schleier apply to the broadened employment discrimination
claims? There appear three possible results. First, even with the
broadened remedies, the aggregate limitations still mean that these
employment discrimination acts are not tort-like. Under the Burke
prong, therefore, no part of the recovery is excludable.
Second, under the Burke prong, t~ese claims are tort-like; under the
Schleier prong, the Title VII damages component (back pay) is taxable,
the section 1981 a nonpunitive component is excludable, and the section
1981 a punitive component is not excludable because of the blanket rule

(1993) (quoting Teamsters v. United States. 431 U.S. 324, 325 n.15 (1977». Disparate impact
claims may not be brought under section 1981a. See 42 U.S.c. § 198Ia(a)(l) (Supp. V 1993).
134. See 42 U.S.c. § 1981 a(a)(2).
135. Id. § 198Ia(c). In Landgrafv. USI Film Products. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994). the Supreme
Court held that the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 do not apply retroactively. Id. at
1508.
136. Rev. Rut. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61. suspended by I.R.S. Notice 95-45,1995-34 I.R.B. 20.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to provide for a "full range of compensatory
damages, as well as punitive damages where appropriate," id.. for disparate treatment claims. The
Service distinguished sex-based disparate impact claims, not amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, lor which the remedies continue to be limited to those applicable in Burke. Id.
137.

Id

138. With respect to ADA claims, the ruling in its entirety states. "Similar results will apply
to amounts received under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213."
Because all other claims considered by the ruling deal with employment discrimination, we do not
know whether the ruling means that (I) damages received on account of all ADA claims, (2)
damages received on account of employment-related ADA claims. or (3) damages received on
account of employment-related disparate treatment ADA claims, are excludable.
139. See supra text accompanying note 118.
140. Notice 95-45, 1995-34 I.R.B. 20.
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for punitive damages. 141 While this result would continue to treat back
pay in discrimination cases differently from lost wages in automobile
accident cases (which Schleier seemingly requires), it would still leave
open section 1981 and section 1983 cases, because in those cases back
pay is not a separate claim (as under Title VII) but is part of the
damages recoverable under sections 1981 and 1983. Under this result,
section 1981 and 1983 cases either would have to be reexamined (with
lost wage recoveries found taxable) or found to be exceptions to
Schleier.
Finally, under the Burke prong, these claims are tort-like; under the
Schleier prong, all nonpunitive damages, including back pay under Title
VII and compensatory damages under section 1981 a, are excludable
because Title VII/section 1981 a recoveries are treated like excludable
section 1981 and 1983 recoveries, with punitive damages components
taxable as in result two.
The Service apparently will take the first crack at the answer when
it decides what to do with Revenue Ruling 93-88. The Tax Court and
the lower federal courts will have their chance, and without doubt we
will need at least one more Supreme Court decision construing section
104(a)(2) in light of the employment discrimination statutes (which will
be the third such decision since 1992). Congressional action appears
likely.142
Following Schleier, we know that a RIFed employee over 40 years
of age cannot succeed on the legal point that an AbEA claim is a tort
for section 104(a)(2) purposes. Until the next Supreme Court decision,
all other protected group members can succeed on the legal point that
the other employment discrimination claims are tort-like, and that some
portion of the damages recovered under a Title VII/section 1981 a action
is excludable. No doubt a lot of lawyerly and judicial energy (not to
mention ink and printer toner) will be spilled in deciding which
components of recovery under a Title VII/section 1981 a action are
excludable. 143 Nonetheless, all protected-group employees under Title

141. TIlis result leaves open, of course, what happens with post-1991 punitive damages in
cases involving physical injury.
142. On September 22, 1995, the Ways and Means Committee forwarded reconciliation tax
recommendations to the House Budget Committee. Section 13611 of the proposed bilL the
"Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1995," would amend § 104(a)(2) to limit the exclusion to damages
received "on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness," and would expressly
exclude punitive damages from the exclusion. The amendments would be etlective for amounts
received after December 31, 1995, unless the amounts were received pursuant to a binding
agreement, court decree, or mediation award issued on or before September 13, 1995. Joint
Committee Print JCX-44-95, Oct. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Legis File.
143. See Andrews, supra note 80 (written after Burke but before Rev. RuL 93-88 or Schleier,
and concluding that a Title VII back pay claim is a separate claim from a § 1981 a claim, even
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VII can establish that the employment discrimination claims they
compromise in a RIF waiver give rise, at least in part, to excludable
damages. In order ultimately to prevail, however, they must show what
part of the payment is attributable to damages for such claims.
3. What Portion of the Termination Payment is Allocable to Tort
Claims?
After (1) proving that an employment discrimination claim was
settled by the termination payment, and (2) proving that the employment discrimination claim is tort-like and that some or all damages paid
pursuant to that claim redress personal as opposed to economic injuries,
RIFed employees have to prove the portion of the termination payment
allocable to damages for such claims. Here the proof will be impossible.
When multiple claims are settled, the allocation of the total consideration paid among the claims settled is a question of fact. The
determinative inquiry is '''the intent of the payor' as to the purpose in
making the payment.,,144 The first and often conclusive evidence
examined is express language in a settlement agreement. If "negotiated
at arm's length between adverse parties," the allocations control,145 but
if the allocations are "uncontested, nonadversarial, and entirely tax
motivated," they will be rejected. 146 If there is no express allocation, as

when both arise from the same discrimination, and concluding that the back pay is taxable, but that
the § 1981 a compensatory and punitive damages are excludable).
144. Stocks v. Commissioner, 98 T.e. I. 10 (1992) (citing Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349
F.2d 610, 612 (10th Cir. 1965»; Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834,847-48 (1987), aff"d, 845
F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.e. 116, 120 (1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 682
(I st Cir. 1982).
145. In two recent cases, the Tax Court has reviewed its law with respect to allocations in
section 104(a)(2) cases. Both stated the same rule. "express language in a settlement agreement
is the most important factor in deciding whether a payment was made on account of a tortious
personal injury for purposes of exclusion under section 104(a)(2)," but "in order to be respected,
the express allocations must be negotiated at arm's length between adverse parties," McKay v.
Commissioner, 102 T.e. 465,482-83 (1994). In McKay, the court found that the parties "were
hostile adversaries with respect to the allocations made in the settlement agreement," id. at 487.
and "[a]ccordingly ... accept[ed] the express allocations in the settlement agreement and h[e]ld
the $12,250,215 payment allocated to the wrongful discharge tort claim represent[ed) a payment
tor a tort-type personal injury which is excludable trom petitioners' income under section
104(a)(2)." Id. In the other case, Robinson, the court tound that the allocation in the tinal
judgment was uncontested, nonadversarial, and entirely tax motivated; the court rejected the
allocation, and "proceed[ed] to determine the correct allocation." Robinson v. Commissioner, 102
T.e. 116, 129, 134 (1994).
146. I previously have argued that, owing to the unique purpose of § 162(t), the parties'
allocation absolutely is binding upon the Government in § 162(t) cases:
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nearly always will be the case in a RIF, much depends on whether the
Service or the taxpayer is arguing for the allocation. While the
Service's right to force an allocation is clear, 147 the cases are irreconcilable on whether the taxpayer will be permitted to prove an allocation
to tort claims if the settlement contains none. For example, the Tax
Court sometimes concludes that the absence of an express allocation to
tort-like claims by the parties absolutely precludes application of section
104(a)(2).148 More often, the court permits the taxpayer to present
evidence on the "intent of the payor" and makes a factual finding on
allocation among the tort-like and non-tort-like claims. 149 Tax cases
outside the Tax Court similarly are confused. ISO

The purpose of section 162(1) of the Code is to deny a deduction when allowance of
the deduction would "frustrate state policy in severe and direct fashion by reducing the
"sting" of the penalty prescribed by the state legislature.
When a settling government ,has disavowed an intent to punish with respect to an
entire settlement or has functionally done the same in an integrated settlement by
allocating consideration to not-punitive claims, there is no "sting" to be reduced.
Application of a "substance over form" analysis is nonsensical because it causes the
federal government's taxing authorities to conclude that a state or agency of the federal
government should have punished when the state or agency had indicated that it was
not doing so. Whether a government actually punished when it indicated that it did not.
or a government did not punish but should have, is of no moment to the section 162(1)
analysis. Section 162(1) merely denies deductions for declared punishments.
F. Philip Manns, Jr., Internal Revenlle Code Section 162(1): When Does the Payment of Damages
to a Government Plinish the Payor?, 13 VA. TAX REV. 271, 297, 302 (1993) (iootnotes omitted).
147. See Eisler v. Commissioner, 59 T.e. 634,640-41 (1973) (at the Service's urging. court
allocated a settlement payment between deductible and capital expenditures where parties had
made no allocation, but it was clear that claims of both types had been settled).
148. See. e.g., Whitehead v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 365,369 (1990).
149. In two Tax Court cases, the lack of an allocation to tort claims in a settlement agreement
disposed of the taxpayer's § 104(a)(2) argument. See Evans v. Commissioner, 40 T.e.M. (CCH)
260,263 (1980); McKim v. Commissioner, 40 T.e.M. (CCH) 9, 13 (1980).
In five cases. the Tax Court permitted the taxpayer to prove the "intent of the payor" and
allocate settlement proceeds to tort claims notwithstanding an unallocated settlement agreement.
See Hull' v. Commissioner. 69 T.e.M. (CCH) 2551. 2554 (1995); Fitts v. Commissioner. 67
T.e.M. (CCH) 2136.2140 (1994). affd. 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir. 1995); Stocks v. Commissioner,
98 T.e. I. 17 (1992); Matray v. Commissioner. 56 T.e.M. (CCH) 1107. 1110 (1989); Metzger v.
Commissioner. 88 T.C. 834. 847-48 (1987), aff'd. 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988). In other
unallocated settlement cases. the Tax Court permitted the taxpayer to prove an allocation to tort
claims. but concluded that the taxpayer had not sustained the burden. Taylor v. Commissioner.
70 T.e.M. (CCH) 729 (1995); Britell v. Commissioner. 69 T.e.M. (CCH) 2904 (1995); Guidry
v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2507 (1994).
150. In Taggi v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 744. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). qff'd. 35 F.3d 93 (2d
Cir. 1994), the district court and Second Circuit, citing Villaume v. United States. 616 F. Supp.
185. 190 (D. Minn. 1985), advanced an alternative holding that the settlement agreement's failure
to allocate consideration disposed of the § 104(a)(2) argument. See sllpra note 50. In Ray v.
United States, 25 CI. Ct. 535 (1992), aff'd. 989 F .2d 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1993). the agreement
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Even assuming that RIFed employees are permitted to adduce
evidence in the face of a silent settlement, they nearly always will be
unable to prove either (1) what amount the payor intended to pay for an
employment discrimination claim, or (2) what part of the payment on
the employment discrimination claim is paid on account of personal as
opposed to economic injuries. 151 Under a RIF, the amount paid to the
employee does not depend upon an employee's potential employment
discrimination claims (much less the employer's valuation of such
claims). Rather, it depends upon the program guidelines; often the
payment is tied to annual salary and length of service. 152 An employee
outside the protected groups, for whom the termination practically could
not contravene an employment discrimination statute,153 receives the
same under the formula as one inside the protected groups. In addition,
to the extent that the plans permit variation for individual circumstances, such variations usually are limited to provisions for vacation pay,
leaves-of-absence, and retirement plan considerations, not employment
discrimination claims. Further, the plans sometimes require employees
who believe the RIF process is discriminatory to raise the matter with
management prior to participating in the program. 154 Consequently,
there is nothing upon which an employee can base proof of an amount
paid by the employer for her release of her discrimination claims. The
only manner in which the waiver arguably is paid for is that the formula
of the termination package was increased to entice acceptances and
consequent waivers, in which case the non-protected employees receive

compromising ihe taxpayer's claims contained no allocation among claims.
Id. at 538.
Nonetheless. the taxpayer was permitted to try to prove an allocation; ultimately he failed. See
id. at 541. The court concluded that the intent of the payor was to settle a contract claim. See id.
151. Sometimes. after finding that the taxpayer failed to prove that the payor intended to pay
for a tort claim. the Tax Court adds the lack of an allocation of settlement proceeds to tort claims
as an independent basis for decision. See Fono v. Commissioner. 79 T.e. 680. 699-700 (1982).
aff·d. 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984); Whitehead. 41 T.e.M. (CCH) at 369; Anderson v. Commissioner. 38 T.e.M. (CCH) 1206. 1209 (1979); Hodge v. Commissioner. 64 T.e. 616.621 (1975). More
often. however. it does not. See Galligan v. Commissioner. 66 T.e.M. (CCH) 1669. 1671 (1993);
Lindsey v. Commissioner. 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 488. 491 (1993). affd. 42 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1994);
Dible v. Commissioner. 58 T.e.M. (COl) 556. 558 (1989); Kurowski v. Commissioner. 57 T.C.M.
(CCH) 32. 35 (1989). aff·d. 917 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1990); Glynn v. Commissioner. 76 T.c. 116.
120 (1981). aff·d. 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982); Gunderson v. Commissioner. 38 T.C.M. (CCH)
464.465 (1979); Knuckles v. Commissioner. 23 T.e.M. (CCH) 182. 184 (1964). aff·d. 349 F.2d
610 (10th Cir. 1965); Agar v. Commissioner. 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 116. 119 (1960). aff·d. 290 F.2d
. 283 (2d Cir. 1961).
152. See. e.g.. Taggi. 835 F. Supp. at 745 (AT&T Communications. Inc. RIF program otlered
termination payment plans of 3% and 5% of base pay times number of years worked. up to
twenty).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
154. See IBM U.S. Marketing and Services Company Transition Payment General Release and
Covenant Not to Sue I (1993) (on tile with author).
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a windfall. In either event, the protected-group member receives no
more than a similarly situated non-protected employee.
Although the substantive employment discrimination cases binding
RIFed employees to their releases find consideratipn for the release, 155
they do so by concluding that any amount in addition to what an at-will
employee is entitled to receive by contract or law (usually zero) is
consideration for the waiver. 156 Still, the minority-group member
receives nothing more under the formula than a similarly situated nonprotected employee. Consequently, insofar as tax allocation rules are
concerned, even if the employee is permitted to adduce evidence Qfthe
intent of the payor, she nearly always will be unable to prove that the
employer meant to pay anything for her waiver of her claims. Because
she cannot show the amount paid for her waiver, no amount of the
termination cash consideration can be excluded from income as personal
injury damages, even if the RIFed employee can show that an employment discrimination claim was settled and that the claim is "tort-like"
for tax purposes.
For the RIFed employee, the news gets better when deciding whether
short-term continuation of health insurance or provision of outplacement
services is excludable from income.

B. Section J06
Section 106 provides that "gross income of an employee does not
include employer-provided coverage under an accident or health
plan.,,157 When former employers continue a former employee's health
plan coverage following termination of employment, the .language of
section 106 dictates neither application nor rejection of the exclusion.
The language alternatively could be read to require a current employeremployee relationship or to require only that such a relationship have
existed at some time.
Every authority interprets section 106 to require only an employment
relationship at some time; all post-termination coverage considered to
date falls within the exclusion. 158 The only such cov~rage not within
the exclusion is when the employee can elect either cash or coverage,
but that rule exists throughout tax-free employee benefits law. 159

155. E.g., O'Shea v. Commercial Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358, 362 (4th Cir.), cerro denied, 502
U.S. 859 (1991).
156. See Forbus V. Sears Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036, 1042 (11th Cir.), cerro denied, 113
S. Ct. 412 (1992).
157. I.R.C. 9 106 (1988) (emphasis added).
158. E.g., Rev. Rul. 85-121, 1985-2 C.B. 56,57.
159. A cash option renders an otherwise tax-free benefit taxable to all employees, even those
not exercising the cash option. See Rev. Rul. 75-539, 1975-2 C.B. 45,46-47.
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The first post-termination coverage considered was coverage to
retirees.
Revenue Ruling 62_199 160 excluded from income postretirement health insurance provided to a retiree. 161 Revenue Ruling 82196 162 extended the retiree exclusion to post-retirement coverage for
retirees' spouses, surviving spouses, and dependents, as well as to
coverage for a deceased employee's surviving spouse and dependents. 163
The post-termination exclusion extends beyond retirees and deceased
employees' dependents, however. 164 Revenue Ruling 85_121 165 applied
the exclusion to coverage for laid-off employees, 166 and private letter
rulings have applied the exclusion to employees terminated before
retirement. 167
The instances of employer-provided post-termination health insurance
coverage exist far beyond RIFed employees. Since 1986, the Code and
ERISA require all group health plans to provide "continuation cover-

160.

1962-2 C.B. 38.

!d. The ruling is silent about whether an agreement to provide post-retirement coverage
occurred during the retiree's employment. See id.
161.

162.

1982-2 C.B. 53.

!d. The synopsis, but not the recitation offacts, provides that the health plan was adopted
during the employee's employment. !d. Revenue Ruling 62-199 contained no such statement.
See 1962-2 C.B. 38.
164. See Rev. Rul. 85-121, 1985-2 C.B. 57.
165. !d.
166. !d. The ruling cited Revenue Ruling 82-196 for the general proposition that "an
163.

employee-participant in an employer-funded accident or health plan ... continuers] to be an
'employee' tor purposes of section 105 and 106 even after termination of employment." !d. (citing
Rev. Rul. 82-196, 1982-2 C.B. 53). Revenue Ruling 85-121 held that "[d]uring the period of
layotl: the laid-off worker is an 'employee' tor purposes of sections 105 and 106 of the Code."
!d.

167. Employer contributions made to a trust upon an employee's termination, measured by that
employee's unused sick and vacation days and used to purchase accident or health insurance, were
excluded from the employee's gross income whether terminated by retirement or for other reasons.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9340-054 (Oct. 8, 1993), available in Westlaw, FTX-ALL Database. The ruling
said that employees had "no choice" whether contributions would be made. !d. Under the plan,
if terminated employees had no post-retirement medical coverage through other employment, their
"severance pay" was paid to them in accident and health insurance, id., an elegant alternative to
the cash or health insurance option plans which preclude exclusion under § 106. Here, the plan
forces the election upon the terminated employee. Those employees who would have chosen cash
under a cash option, because they already have other health insurance coverage, get cash anyway
under the "no choice" terms of the plan. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-33-014 (May 18, 1987), available
in Westlaw, FTX-ALL Database, employees terminating employment prior to age 65 could elect
to receive either a bonus, equal to 10 percent of the employee's tinal annual salary, or to be
enrolled in a program providing tor the payment, until age 65. of both life insurance and medical
insurance premiums on the policies in effect with respect to the employee at retirement. Because
of the cash bonus option, all employees constructively received the cash bonus available to them.
!d. For those that elected the program, the bonus was th;: limit of their income. !d. Any amount
paid by the employer in excess of the bonus available to them (but not elected) was excludable
under § 106. !d.
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age" to employees and their dependents for 18 months after the
coverage otherwise would end. '68 The cost of that coverage may be
borne by either the employer or the employee, but if by the employee,
the cost may not exceed 102 percent of the coverage's cost to the
employer. 169
Regardless of whether the employer or the employee pays the cost of
post-RIF continuation coverage, the valuable right to purchase health
coverage at the employer's favorable group rate transfers from employer
to former employee, and that value is includible in the former employee's gross income absent some exclusion. '70 Under the continuation
coverage requirements, the employer therefore invariably sells health
insurance coverage to the former employee at less than its fair market
value. '71 Consequently, the employer always charges less than the fair
market value because the maximum it can charge-its cost-always is
less than what the former employee would have to pay as an individual.l72 When the employer charges less than its cost, or even nothing,
the only analytic difference is quantitative, not qualitative; the difference between fair market value and the employer's charge simply
increases as the charge to the former employee decreases.
Whenever an employer sells a service to a former employee at less
than fair market value, the difference is a taxable fringe benefit, absent
Consequently, in all post-termination continuation
exclusion. '73
coverage situations, whether the employer charges the former employee
all, some, or none of its cost, if section 106 does not apply, then the
former employee realizes gross income. No suggestion ever has been
made that section 106 does not apply to post-termination continuation
coverage, perhaps because it is so clear that it does. '74

168. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat.
1161,1168); see I.R.C.
4980B(0(2) (1988).
82, 222 (1986) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
Continuation coverage for periods longer than 18 months apply for some '"qualifying eventls)."
I.R.C. 4980B(t)(2)(B)(i). Failure to provide continuation coverage subjects the plan to an excise
tax. Id. 4980B(a), (e)(I).
169. See id. 4980B(0(2)(C)(i) (1988). In some RIFs, the employer agrees to absorb the cost
of the coverage. although in non-RIF terminations the employer requires the tonner employees to
pay the employer's cost.
170. See id.
61 (a) (1988). Extending the valuable right to purchase health insurance at
favorable group rates was an important component of several recent efforts at national health care
retonTI. See Woodrow E. Eno, Private Market-Based Health Reform Is the Answer, KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'y, Fall 1993, at 35,39.
171. The fair market value of the coverage is the cost that the tonner employee would have
to pay as an individual purchasing the coverage. See Treas. Reg. 1.61-21(b)(2)-(3) (1995).
172. See id.
173. See I.R.C. § 61 (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(b)(l) (1995).
174. The continuation· coverage requirement was enacted in 1986 and amended live times.
See I.R.C. 4980B(0(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The possibility of post-termination continuation
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In summary, section 106 always has been construed to require only
an employer-employee relationship at some time; health insurance
coverage provided after termination of employment always has been
included with the exciusion. 175 Although post-termination continuation
coverage never has been the subject of a section 106 case or ruling, it
falls squarely within the existing rulings because an employer-employee
relationship existed prior to the termination and all cOlitinuation
coverage legislation implicitly has assumed that continuation coverage
is within the section 106 exclusion. 176
Nonetheless, IBM, which completed the largest downsizing in history
and which provided short-term continuation of medical insurance
coverage at its expense, told its employees, without citation, that health
insurance premiums paid for up to 12 months on behalf of former
employees "w[ould] be considered taxable income to the former
employee.,,177
C. Section 132
Employers engaging in programmatic terminations of employees
sometimes provide assistance to those employees in securing new
employment. Often called outplacement service, the assistance includes
counseling with outplacement firms; instructions on resume writing,
interviewing, networking, and negotiating; and use of private offices and
secretarial staff.178
Because an employee is engaged in the "trade or business" of
performing services as an employee separate and apart from the perform
those services for her existing employer, expenses incurred in seeking
new employment in the same trade or business are allowed as a
deduction under section 162(a) as a "trade or business expense[]." 179
Thus, if an employee paid for the outplacement service, she may deduct
it under section 162(a). 180
When an employer pays for services provided to an employee and the
employee could take a deduction under section 162 had the employee
paid for the services, then the employer's payment is excluded from the
employee's gross income under section 132(d) as a "working condition

coverage being outside § 106, while pre-termination coverage is inside § 106, never was raised.
See id.
175. See supra note 158.
176. See supra notes 160-67, 174 and accompanying text.
177. IBM U.S. Marketing and Services Company Transition Payment E-12 (1993) (on tile
with author).
178. See id. at E-17 through E-21.
179. I.R.C. § 162 (1988).
180. Jd. § I 62(a).
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fringe" benefit. 181 Under that statutory wash rule-no income if there
would' be a deduction-employer-provided outplacement services are
excludable from the gross incomes of RIFed employees who receive
them.
The Service appeared to reach that conclusion in Revenue Ruling 9269,182 but then gratuitously added a requirement to section 132(d) which
was found neither in the statute nor the regulations: 183 the employer
must also derive a "substantial business benefit" beyond what it would
derive from the mere payment of additional compensation, such as
promoting a positive corporate image, maintaining employee morale, or
avoiding wrongful termination suits. 184 While that addition is ultra
vires, there is no harm, for the requirement is meaningless. The
consequence of no additional "substantial business benefit" is that "the
value of employer-provided outplacement services" must be included in
the employer's gross income, and the employee then may deduct the
payment amount under section 162.185 The ruling then purports to
explain how the inclusion of income followed by deduction of an
employee business expense is not a wash because sections 62, 63, and
67 combine to limit the employee's deduction. 186
The ruling flatly is wrong when it doubts whether the inclusion and
deduction completely would wash. "Employer-provided outplacement
services" are "reimbursed" expenses under any sensible definitions of
"reimbursed" and "employer.,,187 Under section 62(a)(2)(A), reimbursed

181. [d. ~ 132(d) (1988); see Rev. Rul. 92-69,1992-2 CB. 51.
182. Rev. Rul. 92-69, 1992-2 CB. 51.
183. [d. Revenue Ruling 92-69 purports to lind in the regulations a general requirement that
a working condition fringe benelit must yield a "substantial business benefit" to the employer, see
id. at 53, but the reasoning is tlimsy at best, and disingenuous at worst. The ruling cites examples
3 and 4 of Treasury Regulation section 1.132(a)(ii) for the broad proposition, but the examples
have a far narrower application, applying only to an exception. See id. When an employer pays
expenses unrelated to an employee's trade or business, the expenses nonetheless are treated as
related to the employee's trade or business (and excludable as a working condition fringe benefit)
if the employee derives a substantial business benelit Irom the employee's service, as, for example.
service on the board of a charity. [d. at 52. Consequently, the substantial business benelit is a
term of a taxpayer-favored exception created by the regulations: it is not, and cannot be, part of
the general working condition Iringe benefit definition created under the statute.
The ruling makes a material omission of fact Irom the description of the facts of examples 3
and 4, failing to say that in the regulations, both examples expressly incorporate the facts of
example I which unambiguously states, "Assume that, unrelated to company X's trade or business
..
and unrelated to employee A's trade or business of being an employee of company X .
Treas. Reg. § 1.I32-5(a)(2)(ii), Ex. (I) (1995); see Rev. Rul. 92-69, 1992-2 CB. 51.
184. [d. at 53.
185. See id.
186. [d.
187. More than "reimbursing" the expense to the employee, the employer is paying the
expense.
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expenses of employees are deductible in computing adjusted gross
income. 188 All such "above-the-line" deductions thereby escape the
Byzantine network of sections 62, 63, and 67, and are deductible in
full. 189 Therefore, the income inclusion and deduction completely
would wash.
To conclude, according to the Service, "employer-provided outplacement services" are excludable working condition fringe benefits if the
employer receives a substantial business benefit distinct from the benefit
derived from the mere payment of additional compensation. 190 If,
however, no such benefit accrues to the employer, the employee must
include the value of employer-provided outplacement services in
income. Then, apparently unknown to the Service, the employee
becomes entitled to a deduction in an equal amount, which results in a
complete wash. 191 Accordingly, with or without a "substantial benefit,"
RIFed employees will have no income tax consequences from the
receipt of "employer-provided outplacement services."
III. CONCLUSION

In the last two years, one million or more fired employees have
received a combination of cash, continuation health insurance coverage,
and outplacement service. Receipt of health insurance coverage and
outplacement service is excludable from gross income under sections
106 and 132, respectively, but receipt of cash is not excludable under
section 104(a)(2).
Courts interpreting section 104(a)(2) implicitly apply a three-part test:
First, what, if any, claims did the payment settle? Second, are any of
those claims tort-like, and were damages received on their account for
personal, not economic, injuries? Third, what portion of the payment
is allocable to the tort (or tort-like) claims? Amendments made to the
ADEA in 1990, and judicial application of those principles to other
employment discrimination statutes, make clear both that the discrimination statutes apply to job reduction programs and that waivers executed
as part of such programs must be supported by consideration beyond
that to which the employee already was entitled by contract or law.
Consequently, the waiver settles employment discrimination claims.

188. I.R.C. ~ 62(a)(2)(A) (1988). The Code requires that the reimbursement occur under a
. "reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement." Id. In a typical RIF. the programmatic
termination is itself an ERISA plan, and the "business connection," "substantiation," and "returning
amounts in excess of expenses" requirements would be met. See Treas. Reg. \.62-2(c) (1992).
189. I.R.C. ~ 63(d) (1988) (excluding from the term "itemized deductions" deductions
allowable in "arriving at adjusted gross income").
190. Rev. Rul. 92-69. 1992-2 C.B. 51.
191.

[d.
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Following Schleier, we know that a RIFed employee over 40 years
of age cannot succeed on the legal point that an ADEA claim is a tort
for section 104(a)(2) purposes. Until the next Supreme Court decision,
all other protected group members can succeed on the legal point that
the other employment discrimination claims are tort-like, and that some
portion of the damages recovered under a Title VII/section 1981 a action
is excludable. Determining which damages are personal and which are
economic remains cloudy.
Under part three of the test, the RIFed employee must demonstrate
the portion of the cash consideration allocable to the waiver. Because
there is no express allocation of consideration in the agreement between
employer and employee, many courts would foreclose application of
section 104(a)(2). Further, even in those courts that permit the taxpayer
to adduce evidence of the intent of the payor in the face of a silent
settlement, the taxpayer will lose. Although the substantive employment discrimination cases binding RIFed employees to their releases
find consideration for the release, they do so by concluding that any
amount in addition to what an at-will employee is entitled to receive by
contract or by law (usually zero) is consideration for the waiver. The
older worker or minority-group member receives nothing more under
the RIF program formula than a similarly situated non-protected
employee. Consequently, insofar as tax allocation rules are concerned,
even if the employee is permitted to adduce evidence of the intent of
the payor, she nearly always will be unable to prove that the employer
meant to pay anything for her waiver of her claims. Because she
cannot show the amount paid for her waiver of her claims, n6 amount
of the cash consideration can be excluded from income as personal
injury damages, even though the RIF,ed employee can show that an
employment discrimination claim was settled and that such claim is
"tort-like" for tax purposes.
Conversely, receipt of the other two pieces of the typical termination
package, medical insurance and outplacement service, is excludable
from gross income. Section 106 excludes from income "employerprovided coverage under an accident or health plan." Section 106
always has been construed to require only an employer-employee
relationship at some time; health insurance coverage provided after
termination of employment always has been included with the exclusion. Although post-termination continuation coverage under COBRA
never has been the subject of a section 106 case or ruling, it falls
squarely within the existing rulings because an employer-employee
relationship existed prior to the termination, and all continuation
coverage legislation implicitly has assumed that continuation coverage
is within the section 106 exclusion. When an employer pays for
services provided to an employee, and the employee could have taken
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a deduction under section 162 had the employee paid for the services,
then the employer's payment is excluded from the employee's gross
income under section 132(d) as a "working condition fringe" benefit.
Under that statutory wash rule-no income if there would be a deduction-employer-provided outplacement services are excludable from the
gross incomes of RIFed employees who receive them. By definition,
"employer-provided outplacement services" are "reimbursed" expenses,
under any sensible definitions of "reimbursed" and "employer."
Reimbursed expenses of employees are deductible in full when
computing adjusted gross income, so the income inclusion and
deduction would wash completely; the limits applicable to unreimbursed
employee expenses do not apply.
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